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Abstract 
 
Regulation of environmental externalities like global warming from the burning of fossil fuels 
(e.g., coal and oil) is often done by capping both emission flows and stocks. For example, the 
European Union and states in the Northeastern United States have introduced caps on flows of 
carbon emissions while the stated goal of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
which provides the science behind the current global climate negotiations is to stabilize the 
atmospheric stock of carbon. Flow regulation is often local or regional in nature, while stock 
regulation is global. How do these multiple pollution control efforts interact when a 
nonrenewable resource creates pollution? In this paper we show that local and global pollution 
control efforts, if uncoordinated, may exacerbate environmental externalities. For example, a 
stricter cap on emission flows may actually increase the global pollution stock and hasten the date 
when the global pollution cap is reached. 
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Think Globally, Act Locally? 
Stock vs Flow Regulation of a Fossil Fuel 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Environmental problems such as global warming are being addressed both globally through 
mechanisms such as the Kyoto Protocol and locally as in the United States and the European 
Union where many states and member countries have developed their own clean carbon policies 
and targets. For example in the US, at last count 29 states have implemented local measures that 
aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from electric utilities and trucks, buses and sport utility 
vehicles, as part of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the Western Climate 
Initiative that includes several states such as California and Arizona as well as provinces from 
Canada. The European Union has implemented carbon emission caps under the European 
Trading System (ETS) which has been operational for some time. 
 
On the other hand, a stated goal of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) which 
provides the science behind the international negotiations on climate change is a stabilization of 
pollution concentration (for the IPCC‟s atmospheric stabilization goals, see IPCC (2001).2 NASA 
Chief Climate Scientist James Hansen writes  
 
“If humanity wishes to preserve a planet similar to that on which civilization developed and to 
which life on Earth is adapted, paleoclimatic evidence and ongoing climate change suggest that 
CO2 will need to be reduced from its current 385 ppm to at most 350 ppm” (Hansen et al., 2008, 
pp. 1).  
 
Since fossil fuels account for 75% of global emissions (rest is mainly deforestation), this target 
may be assumed to be a direct cap on the stock of carbon from the burning of fossil fuels. Thus 
we may have situations where the same externality is being subject to different regulatory 
policies at the same time.
3
 In a recent policy paper on the architecture of global climate policy, 
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 although the actual agreement is subject to political considerations (some countries may be exempt from targets for 
a period) and may be cast in terms of emissions limits mainly to begin a period during which the necessary 
institutional mechanisms are put in place. 
3
 Sometimes, the same source creates multiple externalities at the local and global level. For example, the burning of 
coal produces both sulphur and carbon. The flow of sulphur creates environmental externalities such as acid rain, and 
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Jeffrey Frankel (2009) suggests that one way to get developing countries to sign in is to have 
developed economies follow emission reduction targets for a period followed by global mandates 
for all countries. That is, a period of local regulation in regions such as the EU and North 
America, followed by global regulation. 
 
The analogous issue of central and local regulation has been studied for transboundary pollution 
by List and Mason (2001) in a game theoretic context. However they do not consider a 
nonrenewable resource. In this paper, we model this local-global problem for a nonrenewable 
resource which creates an environmental externality – imagine the burning of coal to produce 
electricity. This externality is regulated by a social planner both globally by means of a stock 
constraint and locally through a flow constraint. We investigate the joint effects of these two 
regulatory instruments in a dynamic setting. The question we ask is: what is the impact of local 
and global regulation on the use of a polluting resource? Can action at one level mitigate the need 
for action at the other level? Under what conditions might we want an externality to be regulated 
both locally and globally or through only one of these two means?  
 
These questions are important to ask because multiple regulatory instruments may be 
implemented in an uncoordinated fashion.
4
 Furthermore these regulations have different costs 
associated with them. It may be less costly to implement local pollution standards in a state then 
develop global standards involving many countries, as we have seen from the protracted 
negotiations following the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
An important methodological goal of the paper is to develop a model that can integrate strands of 
the literature on nonrenewable resources in which both stock (Chakravorty, Magne and Moreaux, 
2006) and flow constraints (such as in Amigues et al (1998), Smulders and Van der Werf (2006)) 
have been used. We examine how these two types of caps jointly affect resource extraction and 
                                                                                                                                                              
also adds to the stock of carbon in the atmosphere. Yang (2007) addresses the management of short-lived local 
externalities like sulphur and long-lived global externalities such as greenhouse gases. 
4
 During the regime of President George W. Bush, while the US was cool towards negotiating an international 
climate treaty, several states went ahead unilaterally to start an emissions cap and trade program in the North-East. 
This program is ongoing and has resulted in significant emission reductions as well as generating modest revenues 
from the auctioning of carbon permits. It is not clear whether and how these regional efforts will ultimately be 
coordinated with any international action that may emerge in the near future. 
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under what conditions one of these instruments may work better than the other for managing 
externalities. 
 
We show that while local regulation reduces the use of a polluting resource, it may delay the 
arrival of a clean substitute. On the other hand, flow regulation may make stock regulation 
redundant, i.e., the stock of pollution may remain under the globally mandated cap, especially if 
the endowment of the polluting resource is relatively small. When the reserves of the polluting 
resource (such as coal) are large, local regulation kicks in at the beginning of the time horizon 
and global regulation is imposed only later in time.
5
 In general, local regulation when binding, 
helps slow the growth of global emissions and may delay the time when global regulation 
becomes binding. However once global regulation is in place, there is no role for local regulation 
anymore. The latter becomes redundant. This is because scarcity causes fossil fuel prices to rise, 
so the extraction rate and hence the flow of emissions declines over time. Once the flow is no 
longer binding, it does not bind in the future. From a policy point of view, these results suggest 
that it may be important to develop local instruments relatively earlier in the planning horizon, 
which in turn may provide policy makers the much needed breathing space to organize an 
agreement on global regulation of the pollution stock. 
 
A counter-intuitive result from our analysis is that tightening regulation at one level may 
exacerbate pollution problems at another level. For example, if the regulator chooses a stricter 
global cap on the stock, that may reduce fossil fuel prices and increase pollution flows over some 
other time period. Moreover, if the atmospheric dilution of pollution is significant, then the rise in 
emissions may lead to a faster arrival at the global cap. A general result is that tightening the cap 
will lead to a longer duration at the cap and a delay in the complete transition to the clean 
substitute. These results suggest that pollution regulation at the local and global levels may need 
to be coordinated. In the absence of coordination, a policy change at one level may worsen 
pollution problems at another level, because of the dynamic effects of the policy change. 
 
Section 2 develops the extended Hotelling model with local and global regulation. Section 3 
discusses the effects of the two types of regulation on the use of the polluting resource and arrival 
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 In this case, Frankel‟s proposal may be efficient from an economic perspective. 
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of the clean substitute. Section 4 examines the effect of tightening the local and global regulation 
on the equilibrium stock of pollution and resource prices. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Model 
We adopt the standard Hotelling model in which a social planner derives utility from using a 
polluting nonrenewable resource. Let us call it coal. The utility function is given by ( )u q where 
q is the flow of energy at time t . This function is assumed strictly increasing and concave and 
satisfies the Inada condition 
0
lim ( )
q
u q

   . Let p denote the function ( )u q  and let the 
corresponding demand function, the inverse of ( )u q , be denoted by ( )D p . Under the above 
assumptions, ( )D p  is well defined over some 0( , )p  where 0 0lim ( ), 0
q
p u q p

  . 
 
The initial stock of the nonrenewable resource is assumed known and is denoted by 0X . Let ( )X t
be the residual stock of coal at time t and ( )x t be the instantaneous extraction rate. Then 
 
( ) ( )X t x t  .          (1) 
 
Let the extraction and processing cost of coal be a constant xc . Let ( )z t be the emission from 
burning coal, and we assume that one unit of coal leads to b pollution units, that is ( ) ( )z t bx t . 
However, b does not really play any significant role in the subsequent analysis, so we equate it to 
unity by appropriate choice of units.
6
 Then ( ) ( )z t x t . Each unit of coal creates one unit of 
pollution. Pollution emissions can thus be written in resource units.  
 
Pollution flow is subject to a local cap ( )x t x . In Appendix A, we show that multiple 
homogenous regions with emission caps can be aggregated into a single region. We interpret the 
emissions cap as „local‟ regulation. However, this policy need not be strictly local. Any policy 
that limits emissions will suffice, such as the regulation of a pollutant (e.g., sulphur) whose 
emissions are perfectly correlated with the burning of the fossil fuel. Then the regulated level of 
coal use is given by x and we can define the corresponding price as ( )p u x . If p were lower 
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 The complete analysis for 1b  can be obtained by writing to the authors. 
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than xc then no coal will be burned since the price will be below the cost of extraction. The flow 
of emissions will not exceed the regulated level. 
 
Apart from local externalities, the burning of coal leads to the build-up of the stock of carbon 
leading to global pollution, such as from warming of the planet. For simplicity, we assume that 
these global damages can only be regulated by some central authority. This may be a federal 
agency such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for domestic pollutants or a world 
body such as the IPCC that regulates global pollution stocks. Again, there is nothing sacred about 
this assumption but it helps to distinguish between the two policy instruments in our model. 
Define the stock of pollution at time t from coal burning by ( )Z t . Then the build-up of pollution 
is given by 
  
( ) ,Z t x Z 
         (2)
 
  
where 0Z is the initial stock of pollution, which is exogenously given. For simplicity, instead of 
assuming an explicit damage function for the global externality, we assume that damages are 
negligible when the stock is below some regulated level Z and infinite beyond. That is, ( )Z t Z
and 0Z Z . 
7
 We can compute the maximum quantity of coal that can be used while satisfying 
the global constraint, derived from (1) as x Z  . Define the corresponding price of energy as  
( )p u x  . We must have xc p  in order to burn coal before the global cap is achieved. Note 
that p p  iff x Z x  .  
 
Let there be a backstop resource which is pollution free. Let ( )y t denote consumption of this 
resource and yc its unit cost of production. For convenience we will call this clean resource solar 
energy. We make the usual assumption that the unit cost of extraction of coal is lower than the 
cost of using solar energy, i.e., x yc c . These resources are perfect substitutes so that total 
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play a critical role. 
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energy consumption at any time is given by ( ) ( ) ( )q t x t y t   . Let y be the given available flow of 
solar energy. Then we assume that ( )yy D c , i.e., there is sufficient solar energy to supply the 
entire demand at its unit cost. Under these assumptions, there is no scarcity rent in the solar 
industry. 
 
Given a discount rate 0r  , the social planner chooses the energy mix by maximizing the 
discounted net surplus subject to the local and global caps, and solves 
 
,
0
[ ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )] rtx y
x y
Max u x t y t c x t c y t e dt

  
      (3) 
 
subject to (1) and (2). For convenience we use  as the multiplier function attached to (2) so 
that the value of  is positive. The Lagrangian may then be written as   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,x y x yL u x y c x c y x x Z x x Z Z x y                    
 
which yields the necessary conditions 
 
( ) x xu x y c          
 
      (4) 
 
( ) y yu x y c              (5) 
 
together with the complementary slackness conditions:  
 
( ) 0 , 0 , 0
0 , 0 , 0
0 , 0 , 0 .
x x
y y
x x x x
x x
y y
 
 
 
    
  
  
       (6)   
 
The dynamics of the costate variables is given by 
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r 
      
    (7) 
( )  andr     
    
     (8) 
( ) 0, 0, 0.Z Z Z Z     
   
    (9) 
 
Finally the transversality conditions are lim ( ) ( ) 0 and lim ( ) ( ) 0.
t t
t X t t Z t 
 
  The variable ( )t is 
the scarcity rent of the nonrenewable resource and ( )t which is positive represents the tax on a 
unit of pollution as a result of the global cap. Note that we also have  which is the cost of the 
local cap – thus we have two types of taxes in this model. Both taxes are on per unit of pollution - 
  is the tax per unit of emissions as a result of the global cap, and  is the tax from the local 
cap. If the global stock constraint is slack over any period of time  0 1[ , ]t t t   then ( ) 0t   so that 
0( )( )
0( ) ( )
r t t
t t e
     during that time period. If 0Z Z  , that is, if the initial stock of pollution is 
strictly lower than the regulated cap, then ( )t  must increase exponentially over an initial time 
period until the global ceiling is achieved. Finally, if the global ceiling is no longer binding 
beyond some time t , then the shadow price of the pollution stock must be zero beyond t . 
 
3. Resource Use under Joint Regulation 
Without any regulation on the flow or stock of emissions, the extraction path will be pure 
Hotelling. Coal will supply all the energy until it is completely exhausted and then solar energy 
will take over. Because of Hotelling, the price of coal will increase over time, hence extraction 
and emissions (which are proportional) will decrease. Thus emissions will be at a maximum at 
the initial time 0t  . This suggests that if local regulation were to be binding, it must be at the 
beginning of the program. But it is not clear whether the stock of pollution will also be maximum 
at the initial time. If at time 0t  , (0)x Z , that is, initial emissions are below the natural 
dilution level, then by (2) the stock of pollution will be permanently decreasing from its initial 
value 0Z . However if not, then the stock of pollution will increase initially. 
 
To make the problem non-trivial, let us assume that the local and global regulated levels x  and 
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Z  are sufficiently strict, or alternatively, coal is abundant or dirty,
8
 so that at least one of the caps 
will bind. 
 
A Strict Local Cap Makes Global Regulation Redundant 
Consider the case x x  or equivalently, p p  . This may occur when local regulation is strict 
relative to global regulation. For example, a region may care more for its own environmental 
quality than for the global stock of pollution, or pollution damages may be higher at the local 
level (e.g., densely populated areas) requiring a stricter cap. The above inequality implies that   
x x Z  so that if local regulation is satisfied, then starting from the initial pollution stock  
0Z Z  , the stock must always stay under the global cap Z . Because of the local cap, emissions 
will never reach the level allowed at the global cap. The global regulation will never bind and it is 
therefore redundant. We can discuss the following three cases: 
 
A Cheap Clean Substitute 
It turns out that the order of extraction depends on the cost of solar energy. If solar were 
sufficiently cheap, satisfying the condition yc p , then the program could use solar energy 
along with cheap coal (recall that x yc c ). Thus it is easy to conclude that coal will be used at 
the maximum regulated level x , and residual demand will be supplied by the more expensive 
solar energy, given by ( )yD c x . This path is followed until all coal is exhausted at time T
beyond which only solar energy is used. The price and extraction paths are shown in Fig. 1. 
 
[Fig. 1 here] 
 
The price of energy is constant and equal to yc . It cannot rise above yc because ultimately solar 
must become the sole supplier of energy. Solar energy must be employed at the onset because the 
price p when coal is constrained is higher than the price of solar energy ( yc p ). Both the 
Hotelling solution (with no regulation) and the solution under a local cap are shown in Fig.1. The 
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 Since the pollution units are normalized so that 1b  , dirty coal would also mean abundance of the resource. 
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initial shadow price of coal 0

 must be lower than 0
H , its level in an unconstrained (without a 
local cap) model, where the superscript H represents the pure Hotelling solution with no 
regulation. The Hotelling shadow price must be bounded above by the extraction cost differential 
between the two resources, so we have 0 0
H
y xc c 
    . As shown in the figure, solar energy 
kicks in from the beginning and the resource is exhausted later under regulation. Thus it takes 
longer for the clean energy to supply the complete market. 
 
An Expensive Clean Substitute 
We now consider the case yp c , i.e., the price at which emissions are regulated is too low for 
solar to be competitive. This situation may arise when local regulation is relatively lax or the cost 
of solar energy is too high. Under regulation the only feasible option is to burn coal at the 
allowed level, until some time 1t . The price of energy during this first interval is the regulated 
price p . Beyond this time, the price of energy rises and extraction of coal declines but solar is 
still not competitive since its price is higher. Finally coal is exhausted exactly when the price of 
energy reaches yc and solar supplies all energy at that price. Fig. 2 shows the corresponding price 
and resource use paths. 
 
[Fig. 2 here] 
 
In the first phase when only coal is used, the price of energy is constant at p . This price is higher 
than  the unregulated price 0
rt
xc e
 and the difference is given by the local pollution tax 
0( ) ( ) 0
rt
xt p c e 
     . At the end of the phase at time 1t  , the value of this multiplier is zero. 
The interval  1[ , )t T  is a pure Hotelling phase in which the price of coal increases and extraction 
declines below the regulated level since the price of energy is now higher than the regulated price
p  . The local tax is zero in this period and
0( ) ( ) 0
rt
y y xt c c e 
     . At T the price of energy 
finally reaches the cost of the backstop yc and coal is completely exhausted at this instant, with 
all supply switching to the clean solar energy. 
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Compared to no cap, the local cap on emissions has the effect of initially decreasing coal use 
(check Fig. 2). Note that emission regulation actually delays the time when the clean resource 
becomes economically competitive because all of the fossil fuel must be used up. In both of these 
cases, local regulation is sufficient to prevent the stock of pollution from attaining the globally 
mandated cap. In the next section, we consider the case when local regulation is unable to prevent 
the global regulatory cap from becoming binding. 
 
Both Local and Global Regulation Apply 
We now assume that local regulation is not stringent enough to make global regulation redundant. 
More precisely, p p and equivalently x x , that is, in spite of being under a local cap, the 
stock of pollution may still rise to hit the global cap. The analysis here depends again on the cost 
of the clean substitute. So we can discuss three cases: when the substitute is cheap, moderately 
expensive and expensive, respectively. 
 
Cheap Substitute 
By a cheap substitute, we mean the following inequality: x yc c p p   . Solar energy is cheap 
enough that it can be used under both local and global regulation. When yc p , we saw above 
that coal is first used at the locally regulated rate with the residual demand supplied by solar 
energy. This path is maintained until coal is completely exhausted. The question that we need to 
ask now is: how is the stock of carbon affected and when is the globally mandated cap attained, if 
at all? 
 
During the phase when coal is used under a local cap, we know from (2) that the stock of 
pollution accumulates according to the relationship 
0 0
( ) ( )
ttZ t e Z xe d      . The first 
exponential term on the right hand side represents the natural dilution effect over the pollution 
stock. The second term denotes aggregate emissions from burning coal. Solving this equation 
yields
0( ) ( )
tx xZ t Z e 
 
   . Since 0Z Z  and x x , we have 0
x x
Z Z
 
   . The first term 
on the right hand side in the equation for ( )Z t is negative and decreasing in absolute value. Thus 
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the aggregate stock of pollution ( )Z t is increasing and approaches 
x

which is greater than the 
global cap Z . 
 
Consider increasing the initial stock of coal, 0X . Ceteris paribus, if the stock is relatively small, 
the cumulative stock of pollution ( )Z t may not reach Z . Coal may be exhausted before this level 
is reached. Then the global cap will never bind. The solution will be exactly as described in Fig.1. 
However with an increased initial endowment of coal, there exists a critical stock level (call it 
0X ) such that for reserves higher than 0X , the global regulation will indeed bind. Consider the 
time 2t when the stock of pollution hits the regulated level Z . Before 2t the local emissions cap 
binds and after 2t the global cap on stock binds. Beginning with time 2t coal use must be 
constrained to x , and the excess demand given by ( )yD c x is supplied by solar energy. This 
period of joint use ends when coal is completely exhausted, as shown in Fig. 3. 
 
[Fig. 3 here] 
 
The new insight from this solution is that now that the global cap binds, the shadow price of 
pollution is not zero from the initial time until coal is exhausted. In the first period when  
( )Z t Z  , by (8) and (9), 
( )
0( )
r tt e    . That is, the shadow cost of carbon in absolute value or 
equivalently, the pollution tax, rises exponentially. In the second time period starting from 2t , the 
tax starts declining since (9) holds and the multiplier on the global cap is strictly positive. The tax 
rate on pollution falls until it is zero at T when the cap ceases to bind and a complete transition to 
solar occurs. 
 
Moderately Expensive Substitute 
Moderately expensive solar energy implies in our framework the following inequality:
x yc p c p   . Solar is too expensive to be used under local regulation but not under global 
regulation. To examine this case, consider the solution shown in Fig. 2 in which coal is used for a 
period of time at the local cap until a Hotelling segment kicks in. From (4), the price path once 
13 
 
the local cap is no longer binding and the global cap is not yet binding is given by  
( )
0 0( )
rt r t
xp t c e e
     . If initial endowments of coal increase, then the scarcity rent of coal 
must decline, leading to a decrease in the price of energy and an extended stay at the local cap. 
Recall that in this period coal use is constant at the local cap. As in the case of a cheap substitute, 
abundant coal will mean a prolonged first period, and will lead to a sufficiently large stock of 
pollution so that the global cap is binding. The question is when. Note that if no solar is used, 
then the price of energy must reach p but that is strictly greater than yc . So the global ceiling must 
be achieved when the price of energy is yc and some solar energy will be used at the global cap. 
Thus in order to attain the global ceiling, the energy price must rise from p to yc as shown in 
Fig.4. Because both resources are being used at the global cap, the energy price is yc which is 
lower than p . 
[Fig. 4 here] 
 
In the figure, there is a first phase 1[0, ]t with constant extraction of coal at the local cap, then the 
price rises to equal the cost of the substitute during a second phase 1 2[ , ]t t , and finally the 
extraction of coal is limited to that allowed under the global cap, until complete exhaustion of 
coal and substitution by solar energy at timeT . Local regulation helps delay the onset of global 
regulation by putting a cap on emissions early in the program. However, once the global 
regulation kicks in, there is no role for local regulation anymore. 
 
Expensive Substitute 
The case with an expensive substitute satisfies the following inequality: x yc p p c   . Thus 
solar energy is too expensive at the global cap, only coal must be used. When the price of energy 
increases from p to yc , only coal must be used in this transition phase, since solar will still be 
economically infeasible. During this transition, price of coal will rise, hence emissions will be 
lower than the maximum allowed under global regulation, so the ceiling will no longer hold. The 
extraction profile and price paths are shown in Fig. 5. 
 
[Fig. 5 here] 
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At the beginning, the local cap holds, followed by a period when prices rise until the global cap is 
attained during which coal is used at a constant maximal rate. Finally the price rises again and the 
stock of pollution declines from the regulated maximum until coal is completely exhausted 
exactly when the price equals the cost of the clean substitute. 
 
In summary, what is the impact of joint local and global regulation on the extraction of a 
nonrenewable resource? Firstly, regulation of either type will postpone the date of exhaustion of 
the nonrenewable and delay the complete transition to the clean substitute. Secondly, local 
regulation always kicks in before global regulation takes effect. Both can not occur 
simultaneously. Third, local regulation may in some situations, render global regulation 
redundant. Fourth, regulation helps move up the deployment of the clean technology, especially 
when its costs are relatively low. 
 
We can summarize as follows: 
Proposition 1: (a) Both local and global regulation postpone the date of exhaustion of the 
resource and (b) delay the full transition to the clean substitute. (c) Local regulation always 
binds before global regulation and (d) both can not be binding at the same time. (e) Local 
regulation may make global regulation redundant and finally (d) both regulations help move up 
the deployment of the clean substitute, especially when the substitute is low cost.  
 
3. Dynamic Interaction between the Local and Global Caps 
In this section, we discuss how the local and global ceilings interact. Intuitively it seems that a 
local, or flow ceiling when binding will reduce carbon emissions and therefore will also lead to a 
reduction of the pollution stock. This idea is at the heart of current climate policies which try to 
reduce the carbon concentration in the atmosphere by reducing the emissions of greenhouse 
gases. However a flow cap even if binding only for a time will have dynamic effects upon the 
entire path of energy prices. We will show that a flow cap may lead to an increase in the global 
carbon tax, and conversely, a global cap may lead to a higher local tax. 
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Flow or Stock Regulation 
In order to drive intuition, let us first consider each type of regulation in isolation and examine 
their effect on resource prices. Consider the case shown in Fig.2 where the clean substitute is 
costly.
9
 Suppose the policy maker were to impose a stricter cap on emissions, x x  .This would 
mean a higher regulated price p p  . Intuitively, we expect that this stricter local cap will reduce 
the shadow price of the nonrenewable resource.
10
 This implies a decline in energy prices once the 
cap is no longer binding, since 0( )
rt
xp t c e  . This has two consequences. 
 
Firstly, since p is increased and ( )p t decreases, the period during which the local emissions cap 
binds will increase from 1t  to 1t  (see Fig. 6). As expected, a stricter local cap means that it binds 
for a longer time. However, with a lower price, the use of the resource increases and it is 
exhausted later in time. 
[Fig. 6 here] 
 
Moreover, a stricter cap causes resource use to be transferred to the future, when the cap is no 
longer binding. This suggests, as we will see later, that a stricter emissions cap may result in a 
higher stock of pollution. This is a first hint that tight local regulation may not contribute towards 
meeting a global pollution mandate. As shown in Fig.6, the full introduction of the clean 
substitute is delayed under a stricter emissions cap. 
 
Now consider a stricter global cap on the pollution stock. Let Z Z  which in turn leads to a 
higher energy price at the ceiling denoted by p p  . As before, the stricter cap means a lower 
scarcity rent for coal. On the other hand the more stringent cap will increase the carbon tax. 
 
To fix ideas, consider the case of an expensive substitute shown in Fig.5. The global cap (in the 
period 2 3[ , ]t t ) is sandwiched between two unconstrained periods, 1 2[ , ]t t  and 2[ , ]t T . Intuition 
suggests that lowering the cap will lead to a reallocation of coal use from the cap period to the 
adjoining two periods which are under no binding regulation. Since the post global cap phase is 
                                                 
9
 We do not consider all the possible solutions discussed earlier but focus on a few representative cases. 
10
 We show this formally in Appendix B. 
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pure Hotelling, we can conclude that because a stricter cap means a lower resource rent, the 
overall use of coal will increase during this period.  
 
Because the capped energy price p  increases (see Fig.7) while the energy price is decreased 
during the phase 3[ , ]t T  , time 3t will increase to 3 3t t   . The exhaustion of the nonrenewable 
resource is also delayed until T T   . Tightening the global cap again delays the transition 
towards clean energy. 
[Fig. 7 here] 
 
The price and quantity effects during the pre cap period are more complex to describe. On the 
one hand the initial scarcity rent of coal 0  goes down because of the stricter cap. However, the 
stricter cap also implies a higher pollution tax 0 . The overall effect on the price of energy before 
time 2t given by
( )
0 0( )
rt r t
xp t c e e
     is ambiguous. Fig. 7 shows the case when the ceiling 
arrival occurs earlier in time as a result of the stricter cap.  
 
Here the decline of the resource rent dominates the increase in the pollution tax. This will result 
in a decline in the initial price of energy. But the tax grows at rate ( r  ) which is higher than 
the growth rate of scarcity rent (rate r ), hence the new price grows faster as shown. The new 
price path must cut the old path from below, since p p  . Note from the figure that the net result 
is that a stricter cap implies higher coal use and emissions at the beginning, which is counter-
intuitive. 
 
The figure shows an earlier arrival at the global cap ( 2 2t t  ). So the time spent at the global cap 
is higher. However, the reallocation of resources as a result of the tighter cap to the time periods 
before and after may also result in an alternative outcome – a late arrival at the cap with an 
ambiguous effect upon the time length of the ceiling period.
11
  
 
In summary, the effect of a stricter global cap depends on several factors. There is a global 
                                                 
11
 This will inter alia depend on the curvature of the demand function in the neighborhood of the regulated price p . 
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redistribution of resource use from before the cap to the post-cap period. The pollution tax 
increases and the scarcity rent decreases. The curvature of the demand function near the ceiling 
price p plays a role. The new energy price rises faster than the old one. However, the starting 
price may be lower, in which case initial emissions increase as a result of tightening regulation. 
 
Both Flow and Stock Regulation Combined 
The goal of this section is to show that counterintuitive results may also arise when local and 
global regulation are considered jointly. 
 
Tightening Local Regulation 
Consider the solution shown in Fig.5. Over a first time interval  1[0, ]t , only the flow cap is 
binding. During 1 2[ , ]t t , the flow cap is no longer binding but over 2 3[ , ]t t , the stock ceiling is 
binding. Finally over the interval 3[ , ]t T resource extraction follows a Hotelling path with no 
binding regulation until transition to the backstop at timeT . Suppose that we tighten the flow 
regulation from x  to x x    . Then we can summarize the results as follows: 
 
Proposition 2: Tightening local regulation implies (a) a decrease in resource rents and (b)an 
increase in emissions taxes; (c) both local and global caps end later in time; (d) the transition to 
the clean substitute is delayed; (e) the global pollution tax may increase and (f) the global cap 
may arrive later.  
Proof : See Appendix. 
 
We use the insights obtained from the earlier discussion on the effect of the two individual caps 
to present some intuition.
12
 As before, even with both caps in place, tightening the local cap will 
imply lower resource rents. This implies a lower production price of coal: 0
rt
xc e . So in the 
Hotelling phase, cumulative coal use will increase. Since p and yc are unchanged, the global cap 
will end later in time and the transition to clean energy will be delayed.  
 
                                                 
12
 Technical material is relegated to the Appendix. 
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What is the effect of a stricter local cap on the global pollution tax  ? It all depends on how the 
tighter cap will shift resource use out of the local cap period and into other periods. For example, 
some resources are shifted to the last period 3[ , ]t T , and others to the intermediate period 1 2[ , ]t t  
neither of which are subject to direct regulation. If a large amount of coal is transferred to the last 
period, less is moved to the initial period, then the pollution tax  is increased (see Fig.8).  
 
[Fig. 8 here] 
 
However, if more coal is moved to the initial period, the pollution tax increase is small and is 
dominated by the fall in resource rents. Then the new energy price is lower but rises rapidly due 
to a higher  . Then 1t will increase and 2t will decrease. That is, a tighter local cap leads to a 
faster accumulation of pollution and early arrival at the global cap. Several factors may lead to 
this outcome, including a higher natural dilution rate  . If this rate is high, it provides an 
incentive to increase the stock of pollution quickly, to make use of costless dilution. So more 
resources are transferred to the beginning than towards the end of the extraction period. This is 
shown in Fig. 8. However if the two price paths do not cut then the global cap comes later in time 
(not shown here). 
 
A Stricter Global Cap 
When both caps are imposed, tightening the global cap leads to the following: 
 
Proposition 3: Tightening global regulation implies (a) a decline in resource rents (b) increase 
in the global pollution tax (c) a delay in the arrival of the clean substitute (d) and the global cap 
ceases to bind later in time. It has an indeterminate effect on (e) the arrival time of the global cap 
and (f) the local pollution tax.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
As before, resource rents decline with a stricter global cap and resources become cheaper. 
However, the global carbon tax must increase, since regulation is now tighter. Because of the 
cheaper fossil fuel, the pure Hotelling phase of resource extraction is pushed back in time as well 
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as the arrival of the clean substitute.
13
 
 
Compared to the previous analysis, the difference here is that the price at the global cap is higher, 
as in Fig.7. So if more coal has to be burnt elsewhere, it has to be either after the global cap or 
only at the beginning of the unconstrained time period 1 2[ , ]t t  since the terminal price during this 
interval at time 2t must be p , higher than before.  If the first effect is relatively large, the carbon 
tax increase is small. So the fall in resource rent dominates and 1( )p t declines. Since p stays the 
same, 1t will increase. Because the energy price falls, the local tax  must increase.  
 
On the other hand, a higher transfer to the last period will mean the opposite sequence of events – 
leading to an increase in 1t  and a lowering of the local tax  . As in the case with only the global 
cap, nothing can be said about the effect of a stricter global cap on its arrival date. This is shown 
in Fig. 9.  
[Fig. 9 here] 
 
It appears that the consequence of a stricter global cap over the beginning of the binding global 
ceiling phase depends crucially upon the properties of the demand function ( )D p . If the demand 
is highly elastic, the direct effect of a stricter global cap over the price p will be low. The direct 
effect over p will thus be dominated by the indirect effect over the energy price before 2t  and 2t
will decrease. The converse will happen in the case of an inelastic demand function.
14
 
 
Finally we show the case when a stricter global cap implies a longer stay under local regulation 
and a higher local tax (see Fig. 10). 
 
[Fig. 10 here] 
 
In summary, tightening either the local or the global cap delays the arrival of the clean substitute. 
                                                 
13
 In the Appendix, we show that the time duration of the Hotelling phase is reduced. 
14
 The effect of a stricter global cap on the beginning of the binding global cap is independent of whether a local cap 
exists or not. It also applies when only a global cap is imposed, as we have seen earlier.  
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Both policies also reduce the resource rent and therefore may lead to an increase in coal 
consumption. However whether action at one level mitigates the need for action at the other level 
depends upon parameter values such as the local curvature properties of the demand curve and 
the dilution rate of the atmosphere.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have examined the effect of local regulation on emissions and a global regulation 
on the stock of pollution created by the extraction of a nonrenewable resource. We show that the 
effect of the two types of regulation on resource use may be quite different. In the case of a 
scarce resource, local regulation on emissions will always precede global regulation on the stock 
of pollution. If local regulation is sufficiently stringent, it will make global regulation 
unnecessary. We show that the effect of regulation is especially sensitive to the price of the clean 
backstop resource. 
 
More importantly, we show that these regulations may have unintended consequences when the 
dynamic effects of resource allocation are taken into account. For example, tightening regulation 
on the pollution stock may lead to increased pollution at the local level. When both regulations 
are present, tightening emission caps at the local level may lead to a quicker build-up of pollution 
and an earlier arrival at the global cap. This is because pollution regulation leads to a decline in 
the value of the polluting resource and therefore under some conditions, consumption may 
actually increase. These insights are somewhat contrary to the impressions obtained from a static 
model, where different types of regulation may serve as substitutes. In a dynamic model, the 
effect of a policy intervention on the entire dynamic path is relevant and limiting pollution in one 
period may lead to an increase in another. 
 
From a policy point of view, the joint effects of regulation at multiple levels may need to be 
coordinated so that the policy instruments act as substitutes and not as complements. As this 
paper shows, the precise qualitative effects of policy changes are difficult to compute and will 
depend strongly on parameter values. 
 
But some key lessons can be learnt from this exercise. First the local cap reduces pollution 
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emissions and extends the life of the polluting resource and the arrival of the clean substitute. If 
the resource is abundant, the local regulation may not be able to prevent the stock of pollution 
from rising to the global cap. However, it may delay the time when this peak is achieved. What is 
interesting is that because the energy price in a model with resource scarcity always increases, 
once the global regulation is achieved, local regulation ceases to play a role. 
 
These results are important because casual observation suggests that many local and regional  
jurisdictions are moving towards or have already implemented emission regulation, while waiting 
for a global consensus to emerge, such as from the process following the Kyoto Protocol. The 
current state of negotiations suggest that an effective global agreement may take a long time to 
emerge. In the absence of coordination of these multiple efforts within a country or globally, it is 
not immediately apparent whether all efforts are beneficial both at the local and global level. As 
we show in our analysis, in some situations, increased regulation may lead to an increase in 
pollution. 
 
Our model is highly aggregated and we have not considered multiple heterogenous regions or 
strategic behavior both at the local and global level. In future work, the model could be extended 
to consider one global ceiling on the stock and possibly two regions such as the developed 
economies in the North and the developing economies in the South, each with its own emissions 
ceiling. How will region-specific emission caps affect resource use and the global stock of 
pollution when there is heterogeneity among regions? For example, the developed regions may 
have stringent local regulation (say, because of domestic pressures) while the developing 
countries may prefer lax local standards. The effect of this divergence in the regulatory 
environment on the build-up of the stock of pollution and the arrival of the clean substitute may 
inform the policy debate on the dynamic consequences of multiple levels of regulation. 
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Appendix A: Equivalence between Multiple Symmetric Regions and a Single Region 
 
 
We would like to show that multiple symmetric regions imposing identical emissions caps is 
equivalent to one region imposing a cap. Assume that there are n symmetric regions labelled 
1,..,i n . Let ( ) ( )i i iv q v q be the gross surplus of each region i given local energy consumption
iq . Let the function v be strictly increasing and concave with 
0
lim ( )
i
i
q
v q

   . The average cost of 
coal is equal to xc and same for all regions. 
 
Because of the choice of units, ( )ix t  is also the pollution emission in region i . The flow cap ix  is 
the same in all the regions. The pollution stock dynamics is given by 
1
( )
n
i
i
Z t x Z

  . The 
consumption of the clean substitute is given by ( )iy t and its unit cost is yc in all regions.  
 
Under these assumptions, because of symmetry, aggregate coal consumption x must be allocated 
equally to all regions, i.e., 
i
x
x
n
  and each region must consume the same quantity of solar 
energy, i.e., 
i
y
y
n
  where y is aggregate solar consumption. Then aggregate surplus defined by 
( )u q is given by ( ) ( )
q
u q nv
n
 . This function has the same qualitative properties as the function v
, i.e, it is strictly increasing ( ( ) ( ) 0
q
u q v
n
   ), strictly concave 
1
( ) ( ) 0
q
u q v
n n
    and satisfies 
the Inada property, 
0
0
lim ( ) lim ( )
qq
n
q
u q v
n 
    . The cap on emissions in each region may therefore 
be expressed as a cap on aggregate emissions, 
i i
x
x x
n
   is equivalent to 
1
n
i i
i
x x nx x

   . 
Finally note that the dynamics of the pollution stock ( )Z t does not depend upon the way the 
aggregate consumption of coal is divided among the regions.  
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Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions 
 
We perform a comparative dynamic exercise over the system of equations defining the vector  
0 0 1 2 3( , , , , , )t t t T   with respect to x , the local cap, and Z the global cap. The variables 
0 0 1 2 3( , , , , , )t t t T   solve the following system:  
3
2 2
1 1
2
1 3
1
2
2
1
0
0
( )
0 0
( )
0 0
( )
0 1 0 0 3 2 0
( )
0 0 0
where ( )
where ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
( )
rT
y x
rt
x
rt r t
x
rt r t
x
t T
rt r t rt
x x
t t
t
t
t rt r t
x
t
c c e
p c e D p Z
p c e e
p c e e D p x
X xt D c e e dt Z t t D c e dt
e
Ze Z x D c e e e




  

 
 
 
   
 





 
  
  
   
       

    
 
 .
tdt
 
Differentiating with respect to 0 0 1 2 3( , , , , , )t t t T   and ( , )x Z , we get 
3
2
2 2
1
1 1
0 0
0 0 3
0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 1
0
( )
[ ( ) ]
( )
[ ( ) ] .
( )
rt
rt
t t
s
rt
t t
d r dT
e
dZ d r dt
D p
e
dZ d e d r r e dt
D p
e
dx d e d r r e dt
D p
 
 
 

 

    
    



 
 

    

    

 
Next, from the resource stock condition, we have 
2
1
3
( )
1 1 2 1 0 0
3 2 3 2
3 0
0 ( ) ( ) ( ( ))[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ( )) .
t
rt r t
t
y
T
rt
t
t dx xdt D p dt D p dt D p t d e d e dt
t t dZ Z dt dt D c dT
D p dt D p t d e dt
 
 

     
    
 


 
 Since ( )D p Z  and ( )D p x , this simplifies to 
1 3 2 0 0( ) ( ) ,
X X
yt dx t t dZ I d I d D c dT             (A1) 
where we denote
  2
1 3
( ) ( ) 0  and 
t T
X rt rt
t t
I D p e dt D p e dt      
  
   (A2) 
2
1
( )( ) 0,
t
X r t
t
I D p e dt
           (A3) 
the signs of
XI  and
XI  obtained by using the fact that ( ) 0D p  . Now differentiating the pollution 
stock condition yields 
1
2
2 2 1 2 1
1
( )
2 1 2 1 0 0
1
( ) ( ) ( ( ))[ ] .
t
t
t t t t t rt r t t
t
e
e dZ Ze dt dx xe dt D p e dt D p e dt D p t e d e d e dt

        

       
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Since ( )D p Z and ( )D p x  , this simplifies to 
1
2
0 0
1
,
t
t Z Ze dx e dZ I d I d


  


   where       
2
1
( )( ) 0
t
Z r t
t
I D p e dt
   and       (A4) 
2
1
(2 )( ) 0
t
Z r t
t
I D p e dt
   ,         (A5) 
the positive signs obtained from ( ) 0D p  . Lastly, let 0 0( ) ( ) 0
tk t r r e      . Expressing the 
derivative in matrix form gives 
2
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Denote by the determinant of the first matrix on the left hand side. Then  
 1 2 0 0( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) .X Z Z X Zyk t k t r r I I I I D c I          Appendix C shows that 0  . 
We can state the following:
 
 
Lemma 1.  Let 0dx  . Then 0 310, 0,  0, 0
d dtdt dT
dx dx dx dx

    and the signs of 0 2,
d dt
dx dx

are 
indeterminate. 
 
Proof: Consider 
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so that
1 1
0
1 2 0 0 1
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) .
t t
X Z
y
e e
k t k t r r I I t D c
 
   
 
    
     
   
Using (A2), (A4) and the 
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definition of ( )f t  , the sign of 0 is the sign of 
1
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Since ( ) 0D p  , the first term of the above sum is positive while the second term is negative. We 
conclude that 0 /d dx  has an indeterminate sign. Finally,   
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Appendix D shows that 0 0   so that 1 / 0dt dx  . It is straightforward to see that the sign of 
2 /dt dx is indeterminate.             
 
To examine the effect of a stricter local cap 0dx  on 0 and on the energy price on the interval
1 2[ , )t t , we state the following Lemma.  
Lemma 2. Let 0dx  . Define
3
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pH H   then  0 / | | 0d dx   , 2 / | | 0dt dx    
and the energy price over 1 2[ , ]t t  first falls then rises; (ii) if 
ˆ ˆX
pH H H   then 0 / | | 0d dx  , 
2 / | | 0dt dx   and energy prices fall everywhere in the interval 1 2[ , ]t t ; and (iii) if 
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yI D c r I I I       . Appendix C shows that 0  . Simplifying when 
0dx  from (A7), we have 
1 1
0
1 1
0 0
( ) ( )1 1 1 1
| |
t t
y yX Z Z X
D c D cd e e
I t I t I I
dx r r
 
   

     
          
            
         
.  (A10) 
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Let
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Here
XK  measures the first order change in aggregate resource use from varying 0 during the 
period 1 2[ , ]t t , and
XH for the period 3[ , ]t T . From the definition of
XI , we get 
0( ) / ( )
X X X
yI D c r K H    . Thus (A10) is equivalent to 
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where we use the definition of ( )f t . Since ( ) 0f t   as shown before and ( ) 0D p  we conclude 
that absent any quantity effect after 3t , 0 should increase following a decrease in x . Let  
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We have from (A11) that 
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d
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. Next, on the interval 1 2[ , ]t t , we can write: 
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from the definition of ( )f  . Then
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Note that ( ) 0D p   implies that ( )pA t  is an increasing function of time, 
1 0
t
e e
   and  
2 0
t
e e
    ,  1 2( , )t t   which together imply that 1( ) 0pA t   and 2( ) 0pA t  . So ( )pA t changes 
sign during the interval 1 2( , ]t t  and there exists a unique 1 2ˆ ( , )t t t such that 
ˆ0  if 
( ) .
ˆ0  if 
p
t t
A t
t t
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

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We conclude that, absent any quantity effect after 3t , the energy price during 1 2[ , ]t t should first 
decrease and then increase. But the quantity effect after 3t given by
XH has a negative impact 
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upon the energy price during 1 2[ , ]t t . Thus 1( ) 0pA t  in all cases. So 1( )/ | | 0dp t dx  . Since a 
stricter local cap means a higher p during 1[0, )t , 1t  should increase. The decrease in the price 
before 1t combined with the increase of p resulting from a stricter local cap together imply that the 
local tax  rises. Finally let 
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 From (A13), we have  
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It is immediately checked that ˆ ˆ
pH H   . This completes the proof 
of Lemma 2.             
         
We now check that the proof of Proposition 2 is complete. For 0dx  , Lemma 1 gives 
0 / | | 0d dx  which establishes part (a). Using
( )
0 0( )
rt r t
xp t c e e
     , Lemma 2 yields 
( )/ | | 0dp t dx  , 1[0, ]t t  . Since ( ) ( )t p p t    , 1[0, )t t , we have ( )/ | | 0d t dx   establishing 
part (b). Lemma 1 also shows that 1 / | | 0dt dx  and  3 / | | / | | 0dt dx dT dx   , which prove parts 
(c), (d) and (e). Lastly, applying Lemma 2, we see that for a sufficiently low level of XH , 
0 / | | 0d dx    and  2 / | | 0dt dx   , proving parts (f) and (g).      
        
We prove the following Lemma for the effect of a change in the global cap: 
Lemma 3. When 0dZ  , 0 00, 0,
d d
dZ dZ
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The sign of 0 /d dZ is the sign of 
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and ( ) 0D p  give 3 / 0dt dZ  . Since p decreases when the global cap 
is relaxed, the impact on 3t  andT are not equal, i.e., 
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Relaxing the global cap leads to a longer Hotelling phase 3[ , )t T . Next  
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so that 
 2 22 1 2 0 0 3 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0t tX Z yk t k t r r I e I t t e D c              which yields 0 / 0d dZ  . It is 
straightforward to check that the signs of 1 /dt dZ and 2 /dt dZ  are indeterminate, which 
completes the proof of Lemma 3.          
 
For a stricter global cap, we examine its effect on the energy price during the period 1 2[ , ]t t , 
summarized as follows:  
 
Lemma 4.  When 0dZ  , there exists
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where ( )XpA t and ( )
Z
pA t  have been defined earlier. Let 
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Since 1 0te e   , 1 2[ , ]t t   we have 1( ) 0
X
pA t  , 1( ) 0
Z
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pA t   and 2( ) 0pB t   . Note that ( )
X
pA t and  
( )ZpA t  both decrease while ( )pB t is strictly increasing during 1 2[ , ]t t . In summary, absent any 
quantity effect beyond 3t , the energy price should pivot in the interval 1 2[ , ]t t , first falling after 1t
then rising near 2t . Since 0
XH  , a low level of XH will not qualitatively alter this result while a 
high level of XH will induce a global increase of ( )p t . Using the expressions for ( )XpA t , ( )
Z
pA t  
and (A14), we can compute the critical level ˆ
Z
H  of XH such that 1( ) / 0dp t dZ  . Then if
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H H , 1( )p t decreases which implies that 1 / | | 0dt dZ   
and / | | 0d dZ  .The converse occurs 
when ˆX
Z
H H . This completes the proof of Lemma 4. 
  
Finally for 2 / | |dt dZ , we can state: 
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2
/ | | lim ( )/ | |
t t
dp dZ dp t dZ

 , then 2 / | | 0dt dZ   . 
The direct effect of 0dZ   is dominated by the indirect effect over the energy price path before 
the global ceiling period, so 2t must decrease. 
Proof: Differentiating at time 2t gives 
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where we denote the left hand side limit of ( )p t by
2( )p t which is positive. Recall that as a function of time, ( )p t  is not differentiable at 2t t . The 
first term inside the bracket on the RHS is positive since ( ) 0D p  and so is the second term since 
we have shown that 2( )/ | | 0dp t dZ   for all
XH . Hence the difference of the two terms is negative 
and 2t declines.              
 
In order to complete the proof of Proposition 3, check that from lemma 3, 0 / | | 0d dZ  and  
0 / | | 0d dZ  which establish claims 3(a) and 3(b). We also have / | | 0dT dZ  and 3 / | | 0dt dZ   
which establish 3(c) and 3(d). From Lemma 4, the sign of
1 /dt dZ is indeterminate which proves 
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3(e). Lemma 5 shows that the time 2t may either increase or decrease, which is 3(f). Finally, 
( ),t  1[0, ]t t may either increase or decrease from Lemma 4, which gives (g).     
       
Appendix C: Computation of the sign of  
 
Recall that  1 2 0 0( ) ( ) [ ] ( )X Z Z X Zyk t k t r r I I I I D c I         . In order to show that 0   , it is 
sufficient to show 0 [ ] 0X Z Z XI I I I       . Comparing (A3) and (A4) for 
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Appendix D: Computation of the sign of 0  
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Fig.1. Local Regulation with a Cheap Substitute: Both Coal and Solar are used at the beginning 
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Fig.2. Local Cap with an Expensive Substitute: Coal is used for an Extended Period 
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Fig.3. Resource Use under both Local and Global Caps: Abundant Coal and 
Cheap Substitute 
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 Fig.4. Both Local and Global Regulation and a Moderately Expensive Substitute with Abundant 
Coal: Both Resources are used at the Global Cap. 
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Fig.5. Both Local and Global Caps with Abundant Coal and an Expensive 
Substitute  
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Fig. 6. Stricter Local Cap leads to a Longer Period when the Cap binds and a Delay in the Arrival 
of the Clean Substitute   
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Fig.7. Stricter Global Cap leads to higher Emissions at the Beginning and an Early Arrival at the 
Cap   
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 Fig 8. The Global Cap is reached earlier with a stricter Local Cap. Global and Local Taxes both 
go up. 
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Fig 9. A stricter Global Cap may also imply a shorter stay under the Local Cap and a smaller 
Local Tax. 
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 Fig 10. A stricter Global Cap may imply a longer stay under Local Regulation and a higher 
Local Tax. 
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